By Antonio Licu (EUROCONTROL, Belgium)
“Bad companies are destroyed by crisis, good companies survive them, great companies are improved by them” (Andy Grove)
The business continuity measures taken by the European Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic led to a significant reduction in the scope of current and planned activities related to the provision of ATM/ANS. Most, if not all Air Traffic Control (ATC) units operated in very limited configuration (a few ATC sectors only) due to the significant decrease of traffic demand. The duty hours of the operational and engineering staff have been reduced respectively. Staff training and equipment maintenance plans might not have been followed due to the social and physical distancing rules introduced. Some facilities could have been put in ‘sleep’ mode due to absence of operational need and/or of staff to use them
Providers have taken several measures to ensure the wellbeing of their staff. The measures were with dual aim – to protect the health and safety of the workforce in the same time with business continuity assurance. In summary a matching a demand supply with safety and health first using the following principles: minimize the number of people on the premises, minimize the interactions between people, minimize the technical interventions, maximize cleaning. Here are just a handful of concrete examples:
- 1-1.5 m distancing (if possible 2m). If this requirement can’t be maintained, there’s a requirement to wear masks (e.g. for handover/takeover in smaller tower units);
- Cleaning intervals have increased with more disinfecting, etc.
- ‘Buddy of the Day’ policy, where an air traffic controller has to stick to one partner throughout the duration of their duty. This ensures that if either of the controllers tests positive, only two people will be taken off duty (rather than the entire team that was rostered);
- Rostering has been adapted to allow lean team work, resp. create isolated teams in smaller units. Rosters with a 10-15% margin above predicted traffic levels (two weeks lead time). Longer shifts of staff that do not meet to ensure one warm, one cold stand by and one live shift;
- Close contact with health authorities to coordinate actions in case of infections;
- Access to premises for externals highly restricted – resp. prohibited in OPS rooms except for urgent maintenance activities.
- Pandemic Task Forces meeting at regular intervals and is tracking operational and health issues. Apart from all MIL/CIV OPS Units, it usually comprises also the companies doctors, health and safety unit etc.
- Plexiglas separation walls where appropriate etc.
As part of the collaborative effort to ensure a safe, smooth and coordinated recovery of the European ATM network operations from the lockdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the operational Safety unit of the Eurocontrol Network Management Directorate developed in cooperation with the members of the EUROCONTROL Safety Team and SAFOPS group a safety argument and a list of potential hazards/safety issues to assist ANSPs in planning and executing a safe and resilient return to normal operations. The purpose of the Safety Argument is to serve as support and assist ANSPs by providing a comprehensive reference to the elements of the ANSP’s functional system that might have been affected during the COVID-19 lockdown period and need to be properly accounted of and managed when planning and executing the transition to normal operations.
The identified potential hazards/safety issues may occur during the extended period of transition to normal operations due to various factors related to the COVID-19 lockdown. The list contains the issue description, the list of COVID-19 lockdown related causal and contributory factors and disruptors, and potential measures (not an exhaustive list) to mitigate their probability of occurrence or their safety effects. When used, the list of hazards and potential mitigation measures should be reviewed and updated according to the local operational environment and the specific impact of the lockdown on the ANSP’s functional system.
Safety argument[1] and review to return to normal operations must be considered in the context of the overall system, not isolated individuals, parts, events or outcomes. Most problems and most possibilities belong to the system. Hence through Safety argument we need to look at ATM system holistically, and consider interactions between elements of the system and not review each safety argument in isolation like as a merely checklist.
The scope of the argument covers the three main elements of the functional system – operational and engineering staff, procedures and equipment, and identifies the elements’ properties that have been or could have been affected by the reduced scope of operations. Such properties include – inter alia – operational and engineering staff competence, training and medical fitness; equipment configuration and certificates for use; changes to procedures introduced during the crisis period, etc.
The safety argument puts an emphasis on the need to set up a robust transition planning, monitoring and management process. Key elements of this process are: collaborative traffic demand forecasting, monitoring and planning of ATC sector configurations and pre-tactical ATFCM measure scenarios; flexible ATCO rostering in accordance with forecasted and actual demand; coordination and collaboration with all transition stakeholders (NM, ANSPs, AOs, airport operators, CAs); targeted safety monitoring and timely identification and resolution of transition issues.
To support the risk assessment part of the Safety Argument a generic hazard/safety issues identification of the ATM/ANS provision during the recovery period has been carried out. The output has been captured in a non exhaustive list of generic behaviours that may occur during the extended period of transition to normal operations due to various factors related to the COVID-19 lockdown. The list is not restricted at one particular level or boundary of the ATM system. The transition hazards are potential safety issues that are not necessarily independent of each other. Some of the items in the list can also be considered as disruptors that could affect higher level operational hazards.
Air Navigation Service providers possessed resilient operators’ characteristics and behaved accordingly during the pandemics:
- They faced down the hashed reality immediately and reacted as described above
- They found meaning for surviving and focused not only on short term survivability but on long term as well (e.g. European Operational Excellence programme that starts in 2021)
- They had the capability to improvise safe solutions with what resources were left by the Pandemics
Finally in my view ATM European industry is resilient because it has a large cognitive diversity – one should never estimate how much cooperation, collaboration and sharing of knowledge and practices is taking place through European organisation facilitation such as Eurocontrol, European Aviation Crisis Coordination Cell, EASA and EC.
More info: Tony Licu
Head of Operational Safety, SQS and Integrated Risk Management Unit
EUROCONTROL – NMD/SAF
Email: antonio.licu@eurocontrol.int
[1] Safety Argument and list of hazards are available on request from Eurocontrol